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As a matter of public policy, the law of South Carolina does
not readily allow the termination of the marital relationship, and
protects the institution of marriage in numerous ways. The sub-
stantive grounds for divorce are narrowly drawn2 and difficult to
prove.3 Despite the apparent existence of sufficient grounds for
divorce, courts still assume a duty to prevent disruption of the
marriage4 and attempt a reconciliation of the parties. 5 Time re-
strictions further delay speedy resolution of divorce proceedings.6
Such statutory barriers are thought to serve a dual purpose of
both discouraging7 individuals from bringing divorce suits and
delaying such suits once they are brought with the hope that such
1. Brown v. Brown, 243 S.C. 383, 387, 134 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1963), provides a typical
reflection of this attitude: "It has long been settled that the public policy of this state
relating to marriage is to foster and protect it, to make it a permanent and public institu-
tion, to encourage the parties to live together, and to prevent separation."
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (Cum. Supp. 1973) establishes the only grounds for
divorce in South Carolina:
No divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be granted except upon one or
more of the following grounds, to wit:
(1) Adultery;
(2) Desertion for a period of one year;
(3) Physical Cruelty;
(4) Habitual drunkenness; provided, that this ground shall be con-
strued to include habitual drunkenness caused by the use of any narcotic
drug; or
(5) On the application of either party if and when the husband and wife
have lived separate and apart for a period of three continuous years. A
plea of res judicata or of recrimination with respect to any other provision
of this section shall not be a bar to either party obtaining a divorce on
this ground.
3. To obtain a divorce, it is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of the doctrines of condona-
tion and recrimination. See, e.g., Buero v. Buero, 246 S.C. 355, 143 S.E.2d 719 (1965) and
Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731 (1950).
4. See, e.g., Lanier v. Lanier, 251 S.C. 117, 160 S.E.2d 558 (1968).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-110 (1962) requires all masters or special referees to whom a
divorce case has been referred "to make an earnest effort to bring about a reconciliation
between the parties" and to certify that effort as a condition precedent to a final decree.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (1962) provides that "no reference shall be had before
two months after the filing of the complaint. . . nor shall a final decree be granted before
three months after such filing."
7. Cf. Note, Interlocutory Decrees of Divorce, 56 CoLUM. L. REV. 228, 229 (1956);
Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 216 (1923), suggests that if a roving spouse
realizes that immediate marriage to his new love is impossible, he may abandon plans for
divorce and return to his faithful wife.
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delay will allow the parties time to reconsider their positions and
abandon the suit.' Regardless of the validity of such justifica-
tions,' divorce procedure normally reflects statutory abhorrence
of marriage dissolution.
In Holman v. Holman,'" the supreme court exhibited this
traditional judicial reluctance to dissolve a marriage and consid-
ered the effect of a final divorce decree entered over the objections
of the prevailing spouse. The wife had instituted a divorce action
against her husband on the grounds of adultery and physical
cruelty. After a hearing on the merits, the family court announced
that it considered the husband guilty of adultery and took under
advisement questions concerning alimony, attorney fees, and
property settlement." In a subsequent hearing, the court issued
an oral ruling rejecting the wife's claim for an equitable division
of the husband's real property." Instead, the court by verbal order
awarded the wife a settlement which she apparently considered
unfavorable.'
3
Once the requisite time had expired, 4 the husband appeared
before the court to insist "that a written, final decree of divorce
be granted in accordance with the court's prior oral rulings."' 5
The wife, however, expressed doubt as to whether she wanted a
8. 56 CoLuM L. REV. at 230.
9. It is unlikely that reconcilation is any more likely during the delay than when the
parties to such a proceeding obtain an absolute divorce and are free to remarry one another
if they so desire.
10. 262 S.C. 469, 205 S.E.2d 382 (1974).
11. Id. at 469, 205 S.E.2d at 383. Since the complaint was filed on April 6, 1973, and
the trial occurred prior to the termination of 90 days, the trial court could not have entered
a final decree. See note 6 supra.
12. In Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 208, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974), the court approved the
lower court's equitable division of property without regard to whether the husband or wife
held title to the various parcels of real property involved. At the uncontested divorce
hearing, the parties voluntarily submitted the entire matter of properties and support to
the court. The husband, satisfied with the division of the real property, objected to the
trial court's order that he pay an additional $25,000 to the wife and transfer to her several
insurance policies. The supreme court held that the award of the $25,000 and insurance
policies was necessary to approximate an equal division of the properties. Consequently,
the court rejected the husband's contention that the money and insurance policies were
lump sum alimony in addition to the periodic alimony awarded.
13. In its oral ruling, the court awarded the wife $200 per month as alimony, one-
half interest in the personal effects and household goods, and attorney's fees of $500. 262
S.C. at 472, 205 S.E.2d at 383. The wife's displeasure as to her award is apparent as she
argued exceptions to those provisions on appeal, but the court, in reversing the final
decree, left the issues for further consideration on remand. Id. at 474, 205 S.E.2d at 384.
14. See notes 6 and 11 supra.
15. 262 S.C. at 473, 205 S.E.2d at 383.
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final decree to be entered because she "desired to give the matter
further thought before being finally divorced."' 6 The court
thereupon ruled that the wife had an additional 10 days to decide
whether to submit to a nonsuit" or a final decree of divorce.' At
the expiration of the 10 day period, the wife still expressed indeci-
sion and the court announced that it would enter a final decree
unless advised otherwise during the day by the wife.'9 Upon the
wife's failure to communicate to the court a contrary desire, the
court entered a final divorce decree incorporating its prior oral
rulings. 0 The wife, appealing from the decree, contended that it
was error for the trial court to enter a decree over her objections.
In reversing the trial court's final decree, a unanimous su-
preme court concluded that the ultimate, although indirect, re-
sult of such a decree was to grant the husband a divorce which
his wrongdoing would otherwise prohibit.2' The court relied heav-
ily upon its prior decision in Case v. Case2 2 and appeared to hold
(since there is no mention by the court of the trial judge's abuse
of discretion) that the prevailing party is entitled to a nonsuit or
voluntary dismissal in divorce actions as a matter of right. Reli-
ance upon Case, however, is misplaced and the view that a pre-
vailing party is entitled to dismissal as a matter of right seems
ill-advised. A better administration of the divorce laws would
result if nonsuits were granted only after careful consideration of
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.23
Initially, the facts in Case are clearly distinguishable from
those in Holman. The wife in Case sought an absolute divorce
from her husband on the grounds of desertion. At a hearing on
the merits, the wife offered sufficient evidence to prove her allega-
tions of desertion but no final, written decree was ever entered. 21
16. Id.
17. Motions for nonsuit cannot formally be made or granted in equity actions but the
court could treat such a motion as one for the withdrawal of a portion of the demand for
relief. See Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964).
18. 262 S.C. at 472, 205 S.E.2d at 383.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 474, 205 S.E.2d at 384.
22. 243 S.C. 447, 134 S.E.2d 394 (1964). See note 17 supra.
23. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoriSnc RELATIONS § 13.8 (1968).
24. In his order dismissing the wife's suit, the trial judge indicated that he had orally
granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of desertion: "This matter was heard in due
course on its merits at which time a divorce was granted verbally and the attorneys were
instructed to draw an Order subject to certain agreements which were to be worked out
between the attorneys." 243 S.C. at 450, 134 S.E.2d at 395.
1975]
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Almost a year after the oral ruling was announced, the husband
appeared before the court to move for issuance of a written de-
cree. 5 The wife, however, specifically requested that her suit for
divorce be dismissed and that her temporary relief be continued."
The trial court granted the wife's motion and dismissed the case.
In affirming the dismissal, the supreme court noted that the trial
court could withdraw its order or verbal ruling at any time before
reduction to writing and delivery to the clerk of court.2 At no
time, however, did the court approve voluntary dismissal by the
prevailing spouse as a matter of right. Instead, it merely affirmed
the trial court's exercise of discretion in granting the wife's mo-
tion for nonsuit.
In Case, the supreme court relied heavily upon the decision
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Vinyard v. Vinyard2 to find
that a prevailing spouse could obtain dismissal of a divorce action
prior to a final decree. In so doing, the South Carolina Supreme
Court ignored the drastic differences between the South Carolina
and Delaware divorce statutes. In Delaware divorce proceedings
the trial court is required to enter a decree nisi which determines
that one of the parties is entitled to a divorce; however, such a
decree becomes final as a dissolution of the marriage only after
the expiration of one year.2" During the interlocutory period, the
25. Id. South Carolina law clearly recognizes that a judgment becomes final only
where the court reduces its conclusions of fact and law to writing and files its decision
with the clerk of court. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1510 (1962). In Gahagan v. Williams, 263
S.C. 279, 210 S.E.2d 230 (1974), the supreme court applied section 10-1510 to decisions of
the family court. In so doing, the court also noted that it is necessary for the family courts
to "set forth the salient facts upon which [its] Order is granted." See also S.C. FAM. CT.
R. 13.
26. 243 S.C. at 449, 134 S.E.2d at 395.
27. Id. at 451, 134 S.E.2d at 396. See note 25 supra.
28. 43 Del. 422, 48 A.2d 497 (1946). This decision was also cited approvingly in
Holman. See Holman v. Holman, 262 S.C. at 474, 205 S.E.2d at 384, and text accompany-
ing note 21 supra.
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 3519 (1935) (emphasis added) which was in force at the
time of the decision in Vinyard provides:
A decree nisi shall become absolute after the expiration of one year from the
entry thereof, unless appealed from or proceedings for review are pending, or the
Court before the expiration of said period for sufficient cause, upon its own
motion, or upon application of any party, whether interested or not otherwise
orders; and that at the expiration of one year such final and absolute decree shall
then be entered upon application to the court by the plaintiff, unless prior to
that time cause be shown to the contrary.
The current Delaware statute provides for a 30-day period rather than one of a year's
duration. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1530 (1974).
4
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court can exercise its discretion to prevent perfection of a final
decree of divorce."0 South Carolina law does not provide for such
interlocutory decrees during which the parties may change their
minds.
Assuming arguendo that oral rulings of a trial court in South
Carolina constitute the functional equivalent of interlocutory
decrees, the Delaware court's position in Vinyard remains unper-
suasive authority. The Vinyard court, which emphasized the un-
contested nature of the original divorce proceeding,3' recognized
that "[u]ndoubtedly there may be situations where some public
interest or advantage gained by petitioner might bar his or her
right to discontinue prior to a final judgment. '32 Other states
whose divorce statutes require interlocutory decrees allow the
trial court discretion to refuse motion for dismissal or require a
showing of cause.3 A grant of discretion, moreover, comports with
the basic assumptions underlying the adversary system in nondi-
vorce, civil cases.
34
The general practice of most courts to grant voluntary dis-
missals in divorce actions 5 is subject to serious criticism. The
ready availability of voluntary dismissals is basically unfair to
instances where the prevailing party uses such dismissal, or
threat thereof, as a leverage to obtain a more favorable property
30. Id. In Vinyard, the Delaware court reasoned that the wife's petition for a rule to
show cause why the decree nisi should not be vacated was a "proceeding for review" within
the meaning of the divorce statute. It concluded that it would be "intolerable to permit
the divorce to become final while proceedings are pending for the dismissal of the whole
case." 43 Del. at 427, 48 A.2d at 499. Moreover, the court rejected the husband's claim
that dismissal would prejudice his property arrangements made during the interlocutory
period because the husband could have foreseen the possibility of a withdrawal of the
decree nisi under Delaware law. Id.
31. Four other states with interlocutory decree statutes always allow an innocent
party to an uncontested divorce to avoid a final decree. See Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,
108 Colo. 538, 120 P.2d 641 (1941); Nicolai v. Nicolai, 283 Mass. 241, 186 N.E. 240 (1933);
Ferrari v. Ferrari, 6 N.J. Super. 384, 71 A.2d 380 (1950) (by statute); and McLaughlin v.
McLaughlin, 44 R.I. 429, 117 A. 649 (1922). Three states have extended this rule to
contested divorces as well. See Doty v. Doty, 108 Colo. 543, 88 P.2d 573 (1939); Sheffer v.
Sheffer, 316 Mass. 575, 46 N.E.2d 13 (1944); and Pickles v. Pickles, 70 R.I. 13, 36 A.2d
110 (1944). See generally Note, Interlocutory Decrees of Divorce, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 228,
235 nn. 42-45 (1956).
32. 43 Del. at 430, 48 A.2d at 501. See also Winans v. Winans, 124 N.Y. 140, 26 N.E.
293 (1891).
33. See, e.g., Labodie v. Labodie, 347 Mich. 592, 81 N.W.2d 367 (1957) (no dismissal
after a cross-bill except by consent).
34. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) with S.C. CIR. CT. R. 45.
35. See generally Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1100 (1942).
1975]
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settlement." Although such tactics alone may not justify dis-
missal, the use of nonsuit as a coercive tool should be one of the
circumstances weighed by the court. Often a seemingly guilty
party to a divorce action has foregone the institution of a cross-
action or the allegation of a valid defense in an effort to expedite
the divorce and avoid the mental and physical strain of relitiga-
tion. Moreover, where it is apparent that reconciliation of the
parties is an impossibility, dismissal of the action serves no pract-
ical purpose. 7 Concurrently, countervailing considerations of
public policy seemingly mandate exercise of the trial court's dis-
cretion. Where a dismissal without the likelihood of reconciliation
is sought, bitterness between the parties often results. Conse-
quently, the children of the marriage are adversely affected 3 and
the continued wrongdoing of the errant party is encouraged.39
Rather than according a prevailing spouse the ability to obtain a
voluntary dismissal as a matter of right, the better approach
would allow the trial court to exercise discretion, weigh the facts




In South Carolina the husband has the primary obligation to
support his children,41 and the state courts have traditionally
36. This was certainly the case in Vinyard where the wife's attempt to avoid a final
decree was prompted by her chronic arthritic condition which so worsened during the
interlocutory period that she feared the loss of her future earning capacity. See note 30
supra.
37. See notes 8 and 9 supra and accompanying text.
38. Since concern for the children of the marriage is of paramount importance in post-
decree proceedings, it seems reasonable that adverse effects on children during divorce
proceedings are entitled to some consideration. See note 45 infra.
39. In cases where the errant party is engaged in adulterous conduct, the possibility
of illegitimacy readily suggests itself. Procreation of illegitimate children, particularly as
prospective wards of the state, is inconsistent with traditionally accepted notions of public
policy.
40. See text accompanying note 23 supra. The trial court in Holman arguably exer-
cised its discretion and found that the wife's motives in seeking a dismissal were unfair
to the husband and that there was no likelihood of reconciliation to justify a dismissal.
41. The duty of the husband to support his children rests upon the common law and
is also recognized by statute. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-51 (1962) (emphasis added) defines
parental rights and responsibilities as follows:
The wife and husband are joint natural guardians of their minor children and
are equally charged with their welfare and education and the care and manage-
ment of their estates and the wife and husband shall have equal power, rights
[Vol. 27
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been charged with the responsibility of enforcing this obligation
when dissolution of the marriage relationship occurs.42 Since the
amount of child support cannot be determined by any precise
mathematical formula, it is generally a matter left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. 3 In fixing that amount, it is proper
for the trial court to consider the needs of the wife and child and
the financial ability of the husband to satisfy those needs accord-
ing to his income and assets; the amount ordered should not be
excessive but should be fair and just to all parties concerned.4
Since it has been held by previous courts that the welfare of the
children should be of paramount concern,45 the court maintains
the power to modify its order of child support."
In Smith v. Smith47 the supreme court found that the trial
and duties and neither parent has any right paramount to the right of the other
concerning the custody of the minor or the control of the services or the earnings
of such minor or any other matter affecting the minor. Neither parent shall
forcibly take a child from the guardianship of the parent legally entitled to its
custody. The welfare of the minor shall be the first consideration and the court
having jurisdiction shall determine all questions concerning the guardianship of
the minor. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to relieve the father of
his common-law obligation to support his children, nor shall it be construed to
increase the liability of the mother to support the children.
42. Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E.2d 237 (1942). S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
115 (1962) states that:
In any action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony the court may at any
stage of the cause, or from time to time after final judgment, make such orders
touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage and
what, if any, security shall be given for the same as from the circumstances of
the parties and the nature of the case and the best spiritual as well as other
interests of the children may be fit, equitable and just.
One commentator has explained the necessity for ordering a husband to support his
children because of the fact that divorce decrees normally award custody to the mother,
thus terminating the husband's common law obligation. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC
RFLATiONS § 15.2 (1968). In much the same manner as alimony replaces the husband's
common law duty to provide his wife with necessaries, an order of child support supplants
a similar common law obligation of child support. See note 45 infra and accompanying
text.
43. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 491, 171 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1970).
44. Id. at 491-92, 171 S.E.2d at 707. Accord, Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133
S.E.2d 323 (1963); Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965).
45. Pullen v. Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 169 S.E.2d 376 (1969); Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C.
263, 130 S.E.2d 552 (1963); Ex parte Atkinson, 238 S.C. 521, 121 S.E.2d 4 (1961). These
cases have read S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-51 and 20-115 as expressly providing that the
welfare of the child should be the first consideration of the court.
46. Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 345, 143 S.E.2d 619, 626 (1965). See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-115 (1962) which expressly allows the court to make such orders "at any stage of the
cause, or from time to time after final judgment."
47. 262 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53 (1974).
7
et al.: Domestic Relations
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
court erred in failing to order an increase in child support pay-
ments. The husband had petitioned the Family and Civil Court
for Greenwood County for a judicial separation from his wife. In
a subsequent order, the husband's petition was granted but cus-
tody of the three minor children of the marriage was awarded to
the wife, and he was ordered to pay $50 per week in child support.
The court also denied the wife's petition that she be given sole
possession of the family home. She then took the minor children
and moved into her mother's home." Two months later, the hus-
band filed an action for divorce on the grounds of physical cru-
elty.49 The wife filed an answer denying the material allegations
of her husband's petition and, by way of a counterclaim, alleged
that she was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of physical
cruelty and adultery. In her prayer, the wife requested custody of
the minor children, support in the sum of $80 per week, and
payment of $25 per month for all medical, dental and hospital
expenses of the children."
In a temporary order, the trial court continued custody of the
children in the wife and support payments of $50 per week. After
a hearing on the merits, the trial court granted the husband a
divorce on the grounds of physical cruelty, leaving the issues of
custody and child support unchanged from the order of judicial
separation in May 1972, and the temporary order of May 1973.
The trial court denied the wife's claim for increased child support
since it found an increase of the wife's income due to her recent
employment and no such increase of her husband's since the
determination of the prior order.51 The wife appealed, claiming
48. Testimony indicated that the mother's home was not adequate because it was
very small and did not provide sufficient room for the wife and her three children. Record
at 70. Apparently, within a week or two after the court granted its order allowing both
spouses to live separate and apart, the wife attempted to return to the home without any
advance notice to her husband or authorization from the court. Consequently, the hus-
band obtained another order directing the wife to leave the home but she refused. Ulti-
mately, contempt proceedings were commenced and the wife was jailed for a short period.
Record at 15-16.
49. The husband specifically claimed four acts of violence: a kick to the head, a
cigarette burn, a threat with a butcher knife, and a hit with a flashlight. Record at 3-4.
50. Record at 9. The husband was currently paying $25 per month pursuant to the
previous order of the court for his eldest daughter's dental expenses. Record at 74.
51. More specifically, the court stated:
There [had] been no change of conditions which would justify an increase in
the child support payments. Plaintiff's [husband's] income has not increased
since the determination by the prior order; whereas, Defendant's [wife's] in-
[Vol. 27
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that there had been testimony indicating a change in conditions
that would justify an increase in support payments.
The supreme court recognized that the trial court had the
authority "to increase, decrease, or terminate, upon proper show-
ing of a change of condition, the support payments provided for
in a judgment of divorce. ' 5 2 The court, however, concluded that
testimony showed the award made previously by the trial court
was inadequate and that an increase in the amount of payments
would have served the best interests of the children.5 3 Although
the court did not specify what circumstances had changed, it
appears from the record that the wife's counsel itemized her liv-
ing expenses in order to show that the original trial court order
of support was insufficient and that certain expenses which would
be incurred by her in order to provide adequate child care had
been ignored in the lower court's order. 4 Consequently, the su-
preme court reversed the lower court and remanded the case for
further consideration.
5
Justices Brailsford and Bussey agreed with the majority in
Smith that the lower court should have modified its prior award
of child support, but vigorously dissented-6 on the grounds that
come has increased by reason of the fact that she now has employment which
she did not have before.
Record at 17.
52. 262 S.C. at 296, 204 S.E.2d at 55.
53. Id.
54. Brief for Appellant at 14-15. Mrs. Smith's attorney stated her argument on this
point in these words:
In the present case, there was ample testimony to show a change of conditions,
that is, the [wife] testified that she was spending approximately Forty ($40.00)
per week for food, Ten ($10.00) Dollars per week for gas to transport the children
to and from school and Five ($5.00) Dollars per week for lunch money for the
children and that she was required to live with her mother to survive or exist
... .There is testimony that there would be approximately One Thousand
($1,000.00) Dollars additional dental expenses to straighten [the daughter's]
teeth and the Court simply ignored this in the Order and did not provide for
the payment of medical or dental expenses. ...
Id. The supreme court did specifically recognize that the testimony indicated that the wife
needed additional funds for dental expenses; it is unclear, however, whether the court
viewed this testimony as demonstrating a sufficient change in condition or an oversight
of the trial court which amounted to error. See 262 S.C. at 296, 204 S.E.2d at 55.
55. The supreme court also held, in addition to the issue of child support, that the
evidence failed to support either a finding of physical cruelty on the part of the wife or
adultery on the part of the husband, that the award of alimony should be reconsidered,
and that the wife was entitled to an allowance for her attorney's services on appeal.
56. 262 S.C. at 298, 204 S.E.2d at 56 (Brailsford, J., dissenting in part) (Bussey, J.,
concurring).
9
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the wife was not compelled to demonstrate a change of conditions
as a prerequisite to modification of an order for child support
payments." The dissent reasoned that the Legislature had not
specifically conditioned such modification on proof of a change in
circumstances." In comparison, the Legislature had specifically
required proof of a change in circumstances prior to modification
of an order for periodic alimony payments.5 9 The dissent thus
concluded that "[i]f the legislature had intended this limitation
to apply to child support payments, it surely would have said
SO.'60
The general rule in other jurisdictions appears to be that
modification proceedings require proof of a permanent change in
circumstances occurring after the original order was entered.6' In
numerous decisions,62 the supreme court has implicitly accepted
this rule and has recognized that orders of child support are "not
final in the face of changed circumstances which may be made
the ground of future application to the court for modification of
the judgment." 3 The dissent, however, explained that none of
these former decisions actually held that a change in conditions
was a prerequisite to modification.64 The weight of this observa-
57. Id.
58. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-116 (1962) (emphasis added) provides:
Whenever any husband, pursuant to a judgment of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony, has been required to make his wife any periodic payments of ali-
mony and the circumstances of the parties or the financial ability of the hus-
band shall have been changed since the rendition of such judgment, either party
may apply to the court. . . for an order decreasing or increasing the amount of
such alimony payments or terminating such payments and the court. . . shall
make such order and judgment as justice and equity shall require, with due
regard to the changed circumstances and the financial ability of the husband
60. 262 S.C. at 298, 204 S.E.2d at 56.
61. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEs c RELAIONS § 15.2 (1968). See, e.g., Reiter v.
Reiter, 225 Ark. 157, 278 S.W.2d 644 (1955); Pearson v. Pearson, 247 Iowa 437, 74 N.W.2d
224 (1956); Grunder v. Grunder, 186 Kan. 766, 352 P.2d 1067 (1960); Warren v. Warren,
218 Md. 212, 146 A.2d 34 (1958); Udy v. Udy, 195 Or. 156, 244 P.2d 615 (1952).
62. See, e.g., Fender v. Fender, 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971); Graham v.
Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970); Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d
619 (1965); Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171 (1961); Powell v. Powell, 231 S.C.
283, 98 S.E.2d 764 (1957); Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 66 S.E.2d 629 (1951).
63. Powell v. Powell, 231 S.C. 283, 287, 98 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1957).
64. Justice Brailsford stated that: "While the language of some of our decisions
suggests that a change of conditions must be shown to justify modification of order [sic]
for child support payments, no case has been cited, and I have found none, in which the
point was actually involved and decided." 262 S.C. at 298, 204 S.E.2d at 56 (Brailsford &
10
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tion is somewhat lessened by the agreement of the dissenters in
other decisions, both prior and subsequent to the dissent in
Smith, that changed circumstances were crucial considerations in
attempts to modify support orders.1
5
In Raven v. Cecil," a unanimous supreme court affirmed a
lower court order changing the custody of a minor child from one
parent to the other. Modifications of custody orders are governed
by the same statutory language with which the dissent was con-
cerned in Smith. 7 Changes in custody have traditionally been
viewed by the supreme court only "upon the showing of a mate-
rial change in conditions affecting the welfare of the child."6 In
reviewing the evidence indicating such a change in Raven the
court noted that
while there is no fixed standard for determination of what con-
stitutes a material or substantial change in conditions justifying
a change in the previous order of the court, it is sufficient if there
Bussey, JJ., dissenting in part).
65. In Eagerton v. Eagerton, 262 S.C. 206, 203 S.E.2d 380 (1974), decided less than
one month prior to Smith, both dissenters concurred in an opinion by Chief Justice Moss
affirming the lower court's refusal to reduce a support order. The husband, a dentist,
claimed a fracture of his right arm which rendered him temporarily unemployable and
the termination of his association with a well-known Florence dental clinic amounted to
a change of conditions which justified reduction of child support payments. The full court
agreed that evidence showing a continuing income indicated that there was no change in
the husband's financial condition resulting from an inability to work. One month after
the Smith dissent, the court, in a per curiam decision, reversed a trial court's reduction
of child support payments in Sartor v. Ward, 262 S.C. 398, 205 S.E.2d 1 (1974). The
husband claimed that the remarriage of both parents and his subsequent obligation to his
new family justified a reduction in support payments. The supreme court held that a $5
per week reduction in payments was not justified absent a showing that the husband's
remarriage had an adverse impact on his ability to continue the payments. The court also
found that his testimony suggested an increase in his earnings since the prior order.
66. 262 S.C. 509, 205 S.E.2d 837 (1974). In Raven, the wife obtained an uncontested
divorce but consented to the awarding custody of the minor child to her husband. Neither
the husband nor the wife were able to care for the child immediately after the divorce and
the child's paternal grandparents maintained actual custody until the husband remarried
and could provide a suitable home. The mother also remarried and sought to have custody
of the child changed three years after the initial decree. The father contended that the
child received good care from his stepmother and that a change in conditions warranting
a change of custody had not occurred. The supreme court recognized that the child's
growing attachment to his natural mother whose remarriage gave her the ability to provide
a proper home for the child and the child's difficulty in adjusting to the change from his
grandparent's home to the father's home constituted a sufficient change in circumstances
to support modification of the original decree.
67. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
68. Smith v. Smith, 261 S.C. 81, 83, 198 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1973). See, e.g., Pullen v.
Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 169 S.E.2d 376 (1969).
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is a showing of such change of circumstances as affects the wel-
fare of the child."0
The dissent's position in Smith clearly emphasized the best
interests of the minor children; however, the Raven standard for
determining what constitutes a change in conditions does not
impede protection of the welfare of minor children. Instead,
whenever an original award of child support is shown to be inade-
quate, the presumption is raised that there has been a change in
circumstances. In Fender v. Fender,7 the supreme court recog-
nized that a lower court's finding that "the increased cost of
maintaining a child . . . required a substantial increase in the
contributions of the husband for that purpose"71 was sufficient.
Similarly, the need for medical expenses72 or the passage of time
during periods of inflation73 have been found sufficient changes in
conditions to warrant increases in child support payments. Con-
sequently, the required showing of altered conditions is easily
attained and the best interests of the child are preserved.
The majority's view in Smith, requiring a showing of changed
conditions, is the most practical and just approach. The require-
ment of changed conditions works to the best interests of all those
who are parties to modification proceedings. Under a changed
conditions standard, increases in support payments are not ren-
dered unlikely and the welfare of the child remains paramount.
Moreover, reduction in payments by the father is more difficult
to attain since any change in conditions must materially and
permanently alter his financial ability to pay.74 Correspondingly,
modification in the form of reduced payments is unquestionably
equitable in some circumstances. 75 In terms of judicial economy,
the better rule would be to require proof of a change in conditions
prior to any modification because "[tlo rehear [the issue of
69. 262 S.C. at 513, 205 S.E.2d at 838.
70. 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971).
71. Id. at 406, 182 S.E.2d at 758.
72. Kuespert v. Roland, 222 Ark. 153, 257 S.W.2d 562 (1953).
73. Craven v. Craven, 119 Utah 476, 229 P.2d 301 (1951).
74. See note 65 supra.
75. The most common situation where reduction of child support may be justified
involves the husband's remarriage. In the event of remarriage, a husband has obligations
to his second family which must be given consideration. If his income is insufficient to
meet both the obligation to his new family and to his children by a former marriage,
reduction in child support payments may be equitable. See e.g., Evans v. Evans, 264 Ala.
2, 84 So. 2d 337 (1955); Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 707 (1970).
[Vol. 27
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/7
1975] DOMESTIC RELATIONS
child support] on any other basis than on a change of cir-
cumstances or conditions is in essence to relitigate it, the effect
of which would be to tie up the court unnecessarily .... "76
!II. ATTORNEY FEES
The practice of granting attorney fees to the wife in matri-
monial actions initially stemmed from the common law assump-
tion that the husband is the controller of all property and finances
of the marriage and that the wife lacks independent resources to
secure counsel.77 South Carolina courts have recognized that com-
mon law assumption7 and the Legislature has accorded the wife
a preferred status as a privileged suitor" with a right to recover
attorney fees in every domestic action regarding divorce." The
wife's right to suit money, derived from the husband's common
law obligation to furnish the wife with the necessities of life,8 ' has
generally been found to include the cost of attorney fees. 2 Al-
though the courts of this state have never explicitly defined "suit
money" to include attorney fees, the two terms have been used
interchangeably. 3 Moreover, the ability of a court to award suit
76. Brief for Respondent at 14, Smith v. Smith, 262 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53 (1974).
77., Comment, Counsel Fees in Matrimonial Actions, 38 NEB. L. REV. 761 (1959).
78. In Prince v. Prince, 1 Rich. Eq. 282, 288 (S.C. 1845), the South Carolina Supreme
Court described the status of wives thusly:
By marriage the husband becomes entitled to whatever personalty the wife may
possess, and to all her earnings. She is reduced to a state of comparative servi-
tude. . . . She is deprived of the power of making contracts; and, of course, of
the means of accumulating property, or laying by the means of subsistence in
sickness or old age . . . . God knows, the conditions of women, but especially
married women, is bad enough . . . [b]ut that [common] law, which almost
enslaves the wife, [also] make the husband liable for her support.
79. This "privileged suitor" classification by legislation is recognized by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Poliakoff v. Poliakoff, 221 S.C. 391, 70 S.E.2d 625 (1952).
80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-112 (1962) provides:
In every action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, the wife, whether she
be plaintiff or defendant, may in her complaint or answer or by petition pray
for the allowance to her of alimony and suit money pendente lite. If such claim
shall appear well founded the court shall allow a reasonable sum therefor.
81. See, e.g., Denham v. Denham, 285 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1955). Cf. McNaughton v.
McNaughton, 258 S.C. 554, 189 S.E.2d 820 (1972).
82. See Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P.2d 953 (1949) and Rubin v. Rubin, 233
Md. 118, 195 A.2d 696 (1963). Contra, Hart v. Hart, 31 Colo. 333, 73 P. 35 (1903). At
English common law, the power to make an allowance for attorney fees and expenses of
litigation in matters pertaining to divorce was inherent in courts of equity. Krasnow v.
Krasnow, 140 Conn. 254, 99 A.2d 104 (1953).
83. See, e.g., Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E.2d 731 (1950); and Sadler v.
Sadler, 115 S.C. 217, 105 S.E. 285 (1920).
13
et al.: Domestic Relations
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
452 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
money or attorney fees pendente lite 4 extends beyond a final
divorce decree to encompass appeals or further proceedings aris-
ing out of the divorce action.
85
In Darden v. Witham,"6 the husband appealed the lower
court's order awarding $175,000 suit money directly to the wife's
attorneys. The husband had previously brought an action 7 pur-
suant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 88 to have the
court declare the property rights of the parties under a 1967 di-
vorce decree in light of his wife's remarriage. The divorce decree
incorporated a property settlement agreement which provided
that the husband make payments to the wife of $90,000 per year
for 10 years, followed by payments of $80,0600 per year for the next
10 years. 9 These payments were to continue for the full 20 year
period, or until terminated by the wife's death during that period,
regardless of the wife's remarriage.9" Since the payments were
characterized as alimony in the property settlement agreement,
the husband contended that his obligation under the 1967 decree
was subject to modification based on statutory right arising out
of the remarriage of his wife9" and the resulting change of circum-
stances.9"
The husband admittedly initiated suit to insure the contin-
ued deductibility of his alimony payments under the federal in-
come tax laws.93 The federal income tax statutes make no specific
84. See note 80 supra.
85. See Bond v. Bond, 252 S.C. 363, 166 S.E.2d 302 (1969).
86. 262 S.C. 183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974).
87. Darden v. Witham, 258 S. C. 380, 188 S.E.2d 776 (1972).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2001 et seq. (1962).
89. 258 S.C. at 386, 188 S.E.2d at 777-78.
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-114 (1962) provides:
In the event the court shall award the custody of the children to the wife, the
court shall by its decree allocate any award for permanent alimony and support
between the children and the wife and in the event of the remarriage of the wife
the amount so fixed in such decree for her support shall forthwith cease and no
further such payments shall be required from such divorced husband.
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-116 (1962) provides:
Whenever any husband, pursuant to a judgment of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony, has been required to make his wife any periodic payments of ali-
mony and the circumstances of the parties or the financial ability of the hus-
band shall have been changed since the rendition of such judgment, either party
may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order and judgment
decreasing or increasing the amount of such alimony payments or terminating
such payments and the court. . . shall make such order and judgment as justice
and equity shall require, with due regard to the changed circumstances. . ..
93. 263 S.C. at 191-92, 209 S.E.2d at 44-45.
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss2/7
1975] DOMESTIC RELATIONS 453
reference to alimony94 and a state court decree characterizing
periodic payments as alimony does not control federal tax conse-
quences.15 Instead, deductibility of periodic alimony payments
under federal income tax law depends upon the existence of a
legal obligation as determined under state law.9" In Hoffman v.
Commissioner,97 the United States Tax Court had held that a
divorced wife's remarriage constituted a change of circumstances
under Illinois divorce law and had removed the taxpayer-
husband's legal obligation to make periodic alimony payments.
Consequently, the court disallowed Hoffman's continued deduc-
tion of alimony payments made to his remarried wife. In
Darden, the husband sought either to terminate his obligation
under the 1967 divorce decree to make periodic payments or to
preserve the tax advantage of that continued legal obligation.
The supreme court interpreted the agreement incorporated into
the 1967 divorce decree as requiring installment payments arising
out of a lump sum property settlement, rather than alimony. '
The court found that the agreement, despite its merger into the
decree, was contractual in nature, legally binding upon the the
parties, and not subject to court modification.101
94. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a)(1) provides:
If a wife is divorced or legally separated from her husband under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic
payments (whether or not made at regular intervals) received after such decree
in discharge of. . . a legal obligation which, because of the marital or family
relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under the decree or under
a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
95. See Laughlin's Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948); Dixon v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 709 (1965).
96. See Brown v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 865, affd 415 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam).
97. 54 T.C. 1607 (1970).
98. Id. at 1613.
99. Id.
100. 258 S.C. at 390, 188 S.E.2d at 779.
101. Id. Compare Blakely v. Blakely, 249 S.C. 623, 155 S.E.2d 857 (1967) with Jeanes
v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970). In Moesley v. Moesley, 263 S.C. 1, 207
S.E.2d 403 (1974), the court refused to allow the lower court to modify a property agree-
ment incorporated into a divorce decree. Although modification may have been equitable,
the court insisted that the decree was a final judgment "to which the doctrine of res
judicata is fully applicable [and] stands as a bar to further litigation. . . concerning the
division of the covered property." Id. at 4, 207 S.E.2d at 404. The function of a property
settlement is to untangle the ownership of jointly held property. This goal can best be
achieved by allowing the parties to make mutually satisfactory arrangements. Courts
favor settlements among litigants and regard as commendable the efforts of parties to
settle differences without judicial intervention. Consequently, application of the doctrine
15
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Although the husband's action was brought by agreement of
counsel as a declaratory judgment action,0 2 which precludes an
award of attorney fees,"°3 the supreme court looked beyond the
mere form of action and stated:
[Tihis suit is essentially an outgrowth of, and supplementary
to, the original 1967 divorce action. ... The fact that the same
issues were presented by way of a declaratory judgment proceed-
ing should not alter the obligation of Darden [the husband] to
pay attorneys' fees if, under Code Section 20-112, the court
deemed this appropriate.'4
The court subsequently remanded the case to the trial court for
disposition of the question of attorney fees.
10 5
On remand, the wife's attorneys requested the trial court to
set reasonable attorney fees for their services.' 6 The lower court
held an evidentiary hearing, limited to the sole issue of the
amount of attorney fees, at which expert testimony set reasonable
fees within a range of $75,000 to $350,000.1° After the hearing, the
trial court ordered payment of $175,000 directly to the wife's at-
torneys.08 On appeal, the husband challenged the lower court's
refusal to consider the issue of the wife's need for an award of suit
money and claimed that section 20-112 allowed such an award
only where the wife's claim was "well founded."'0 ° Normally, the
financial resources of the parties are relevant considerations in
making an allowance of suit money and the wife has the burden
of proving financial need."10 The supreme court, overcoming the
of res judicata to property settlements, particularly where the parties specifically make
the agreement final, encourages creation of such settlements by the spouses and avoids a
source of needless future litigation.
102. See note 88 supra.
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2010 (1962) permits an award of costs.
104. 258 S.C. at 391, 188 S.E.2d at 780. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
105. 258 S.C. at 391, 188 S.E.2d at 780.
106. 263 S.C. at 189, 209 S.E.2d at 44.
107. The wife presented expert testimony from three attorneys who had examined the
files, records, and briefs. Their evaluation of a reasonable fee ranged from $250,000 to
$350,000. The husband presented two equally prominent members of the bar who evalu-
ated the legal services at $75,000. See 263 S.C. at 192, 209 S.E.2d at 45-46.
108. Although S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-112 (1962) authorizes an award of suit money to
the wife and not directly to the attorneys, the lower court's award of fees directly to the
wife's attorneys was found not prejudicial and, hence, provided no grounds for reversal.
263 S.C. at 195-96, 209 S.E.2d at 47.
109. 263 S.C. at 189-90 209 S.E.2d at 44. See note 80 supra.
110. See Lowe v. Lowe, 256 S.C. 363, 166 S.E.2d 302 (1969). See generally 27A C.J.S.
Divorce § 222 (1959).
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vagueness of its initial decision"' and justifying the trial court's
construction thereof,"' explained that:
[In] light of the fact that the wife was thrown into litigation,
jeopardizing her payments for the primary purpose of settling
the husband's possible tax problems, we have no hesitancy in
holding that the allowance of "suit money" is "well founded,"
and this is true whether she be financially able to pay her own
attorney or not."'
The correctness of this result is seemingly grounded on equitable
considerations. Because the husband commenced the action and
would directly benefit thereby, regardless of the outcome of the
litigation, it seems reasonable that he should bear the expense
created by his own conduct.
The husband's main issue"' on appeal involved his conten-
tion that the award for attorney fees was excessive. Allowance of
suit money is committed to the trial court's discretion by statute
and is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the partic-
ular case."5 An award of suit money, however, is not normally
subject to interference on appeal unless clearly against the evi-
dence."' In Darden, the husband had the difficult burden of
showing that the $175,000 award was so unreasonably high that
it amounted to an abuse of the trial court's discretion."17 The
difficulty of the husband's task was compounded by the fact that
the $175,000 award fell within the range of reasonable fees sug-
gested by expert opinion."'
111. See text accompanying notes 104 and 105 supra.
112. The trial court had apparently construed the supreme court's previous opinion
as holding that attorney fees should be paid. See 263 S.C. at 189, 209 S.E.2d at 44.
113. Id. at 191, 209 S.E.2d at 45. Since the husband clearly explained his tax motive
at the evidentiary hearing, sufficient evidence existed in the record which justified the
trial court's apparent conclusion that the wife's claim for attorney fees was well founded.
Cf. Grossman v. Grossman, 242 S.C. 298, 130 S.E.2d 850 (1963).
114. The husband also challenged the constitutionality of section 20-112 and claimed
that the preferred status given wives in domestic actions constituted a denial of equal
protection. He argued that the statute's authorization of awards of suit money only to
wives created "classification by sex that is not rationally related to any constitutionally
permissible governmental purpose." 263 S.C. at 191, 209 S.E.2d at 45. The court, however,
found that the husband's failure to raise this issue before the lower court acted as a waiver.
115. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-112 (1962). See Mungin v. Mungin, 166 S.C. 43, 134
S.E. 238 (1932).
116. Gordon v. Gordon, 91 S.C. 245, 74 S.E. 360 (1912). See note 117 infra.
117. See Young v. Young, 254 S.C. 498, 176 S.E.2d 156 (1970).
118. See note 107 supra.
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Although the trial court can properly consider expert opin-
ion, that opinion alone may not be dispositive of the issue of
reasonableness of fees. The American Bar Association Code of
Professional Responsibility states:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a
lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.
Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reason-
ableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and diffi-
culty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to
perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the ac-
ceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship
with client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer
or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."'
No single factor is controlling, but the court must consider all the
factors in ascertaining the real value of legal services rendered.'20
A majority' 21 of the supreme court found sufficient evidence
in the record to indicate that the wife's attorneys possessed excel-
lent professional reputations and had expended over 750 hours on
the case.'22 They also determined that the litigation involved
119. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-106(B) adopted in S.C. Sup.
CT. R. 32 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 12
adopted in S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33. The court in Darden does not refer to either the Canons
or the Disciplinary Rules. Instead, it examined a variety of factors of similar import:
"[Tlhe nature, extent and difficulty of the services rendered; the time necessarily de-
voted to the case; the professional standing of counsel; the contingency of compensation,
and the beneficial results accomplished." 263 S.C. at 193, 209 S.E.2d at 46, quoting Smith
v. Smith, 253 S.C. 350, 170 S.E.2d 650 (1970). Accord, Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 130
S.E.2d 552 (1963); ,Collins v. Collins, 239 S.C. 170, 122 S.E.2d 1 (1961).
120. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33.
121. Justices Lewis, Moss, and Bussey.
122. 263 S.C. at 192, 209 S.E.2d at 45.
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novel, complex, and difficult legal questions 123 and successfully
preserved the wife's interest in an amount exceeding $1.5 mil-
lion.124 Consequently, the court concluded that an award of
$175,000 attorney fees was reasonable.' 25 Justices Littlejohn and
Brailsford agreed with the majority that the wife's claim for suit
money was well founded but, in a strong dissent, objected to the
$175,000 award, finding it unrealistic and unreasonable.'
26
The dissent argued that the ease with which the trial court
and supreme. court determined the right of the wife to suit money
indicated that the issues involved were not greatly complicated.'
27
If the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing as to the hours
spent by the wife's counsel in preparation of the case were ac-
cepted at face value, each of the wife's attorneys received an
excessive fee of $233.33 per hour.' 28 The unrealistic method of
evaluation which the majority, trial court, and expert opinions
employed to ascertain the value of the benefit conferred by the
wife's attorney was the most objectionable aspect of the majority
opinion to the dissent. The majority decision constantly refers to
the amount involved as being in excess of $1.5 million; however,
the litigation, which preserved the wife's right to that amount
under the property settlement agreement, involved installment
payments which were contingent upon the wife's survival.'2 ' Con-
sequently, the dissent argued that "common sense tells us that
even without regard to the contingency of their [installment pay-
ments'] accrual, such value is very substantially less than their
sum."130
The dissent is correct in assessing the benefit conferred upon
the wife at a smaller sum. At the time of the 1967 divorce, the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 195, 209 S.E.2d at 47.
126. Id. at 196-98, 209 S.E.2d at 47-49. (Littlejohn & Brailsford, JJ., dissenting in
part).
127. Id. at 196, 209 S.E.2d at 48 (Littlejohn, J., concurring and dissenting).
128. Id., 209 S.E.2d at 47. In computing this figure, Justice Littlejohn noted that
"[i]f the number of hours spent on this case is more, the amount per hour would, of
course, be correspondingly reduced." Id. This language would seem to indicate that the
estimate of time expended, upon which the trial court, supreme court, and expert opinion
strongly relied, was extremely speculative and had not been clearly demonstrated.
129. See text accompanying notes 89 and 90 supra. The record does not indicate the
wife's age but the risk of mortality would be an insignificant factor unless the wife was
over 55 years of age at the time of the 1967 divorce. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Cum.
Supp. 1973) (mortuary tables).
130. 263 S.C. at 197, 209 S.E.2d at 48 (Brailsford, J., dissenting).
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husband had an escrow and custodial agreement with the Vir-
ginia National Bank 3' whereby the bank held certain marketable
securities owned by the husband to guarantee installment pay-
ments to the wife. Under the agreement,'3 2 the husband remained
the registered owner of the securities and was entitled to any
income or dividends therefrom. Concurrently, the husband was
obligated to make quarterly payments into the escrow account to
cover the amount of yearly installment payments due the wife.
Rather than depositing the entire lump sum of the installments,
the husband enjoyed the full use and benefit of the payments
until such time as they fell due. Consequently, the lump sum
property settlement should have been considered in light of the
husband's ability to use the money. As such, a discount factor,
which represents prospective earnings from reasonably secure
and nonspeculative investments, required reduction of the total
amount to its present value.'
33
The property settlement had clearly been drafted so that the
annual installments were deductible by the husband for tax pur-
poses and reportable by the wife as income.'34 Despite the obvious
tax motives involved, no assessment of the tax consequences of
the installments to the wife had been considered by the majority.
Again, the dissenters argued that
[ilt is . . . common knowledge that the tax rate on income in
this range would exceed 50%. Inevitably, the present value of
Mrs. Witham's disposable income under the agreement would
bear small resemblances to the sum of the installments, which
was apparently regarded as the resulting benefit by Mrs.
Witham's expert witnesses.
[T]he amount awarded resulted from an unrealistic esti-
mate of the benefit conferred . . . and an overemphasis of the
importance of this factor. . . both by the distinguished lawyers
who testified as experts and by the court.' 31
Although the dissent emphasizes the need to reduce the hus-
131. The bank was a party-defendant to the original action but was placed in the
position in its role as a stakeholder under the property settlement agreement.
132. The entire agreement appears in the record of the original proceedings. See
Record at 17-23.
133. Cf. Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 633 (D.S.C. 1967); accord, Grim-
sley v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 189 S.C. 251, 1 S.E.2d 157 (1938).
134. 263 S.C. at 190, 209 S.E.2d at 48. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
135. 263 S.C. at 198, 209 S.E.2d at 48-49.
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band's obligation to the wife to its present value, no attempt to
do so was made. The dissent's failure to make the necessary com-
putations 36 greatly diminishes the persuasiveness of its position.
Assuming an interest rate of 6 percent 7 and a tax rate of 50
percent, as the dissent suggests, the present value of the wife's
benefit translates into the sum of $495,497.29.131
The majority's failure to consider the reduced amount in-
volved in the litigation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that an award of $175,000 was clearly unreasonable. The dissent
implicitly assumed that the aggregate amount involved, reduced
to its present value, constituted the whole value of the benefit
conferred by the legal services. Such a construction of the term
"benefit conferred" may, however, be too narrow. 39 A broader
interpretation emphasizes both the amount involved and the in-
trinsic value of the services to the client. The language of South
Carolina Supreme Court Rule 33140 indicates that indirect or con-
sequential benefits must also be considered; "[i]n determining
136. The present value of a known future sum can be easily determined by multiply-
ing that sum by one over the compound sum of $1. If P denotes present value, S denotes
the ultimate amount sought to be returned in any given year, i denotes the interest rate,
and n denotes the number of years of accrued interest earnings, then the mathematical




J. GENTRY & G. JOHNSON, FINNEY AND MILLER'S PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, ADVANCED 303
(6th ed. 1971). Since present value calculations are so widely used, tables of present values
of $1 are available to avoid tedious calculation.
137. The question of a reasonable discount figure is one committed to the discretion
of the court. In arriving at such a figure, the court must use common sense and sound
judgment. See Brooks v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 619, 634 (D.S.C. 1967). In 1972 when
the issue first arose, 6 percent was a rate which was easily obtainable upon investments
in safe securities.
138. See note 136 supra. The present value formula must be applied to each of the
20 periodic installments and the aggregate of those sums determined. To the extent that
this present value truly represents the benefit conferred, it appears excessive. The award
itself amounts to a little over one-third of the present value of the sum involved. In this
respect, it resembles the traditional contingent fee arrangement found in numerous tort
actions. In domestic relations cases, however, contingent fee arrangements are condemned
on grounds of public policy. Moreover, since the husband, who was obviously wealthy,
incurred a statutory obligation to pay suit money, a fixed fee arrangement is to be consid-
ered more proper. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20.
139. Cf. In re Coleman, 106 S.C. 534, 91 S.E. 861 (1916), where the court refused to
examine the face value of the deceased's estate in determining the value of legal services
rendered to the estate.
140. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmICS No. 12. See note 119 supra.
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the amount of the fee, it is proper to consider . . . the amount
involved and the benefits resulting to the client from the serv-
ices." 4'
In Darden, the wife's attorneys successfully preserved the
wife's right to installment payments and established the hus-
band's future liability to make all future installments.12 In so
doing, the wife's attorneys effectively guaranteed the wife's future
financial security. While such a guarantee is reducible to a pres-
ent financial value, it may also represent an intangible benefit of
utmost importance to the wife which would not be considered in
a present value calculation. Although such an intangible benefit
is difficult to value, it is important to consider when assessing the
degree of care, anxiety, and responsibility borne by the wife's
attorneys.' The responsibility of protecting a client's financial
security, although speculative and intangible, cannot be lightly
dismissed nor measured solely in terms of present value.'
Despite the presence of intangible and consequential benefits
to the wife, the dissent is correct in criticizing the majority's
unrealistic method of determining the value of the benefit con-
ferred by the legal services. The aggregate amount involved
should have been reduced to its present value and the tax conse-
quences clearly assessed. The weight given to the subsequent
amount involved in the litigation, and the consequential benefits
derived therefrom, are questions left to the trial court's discre-
tion. Had the dissent actually calculated the present value of the
husband's obligation, its view might have prevailed. When the
opinions of expert witnesses are based upon an unrealistic esti-
mate of the amount involved, the mere fact that the ultimate
award of attorney fees was consistent with expert testimony
should not be dispositive.4 5 Instead, the court should have exam-
ined the reasonableness of the fee in light of the entire record.
141. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 12.
142. See American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Jones, 83 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App. 1935). In Jones,
the court may have considered this intangible benefit in rejecting the carrier's claim that
the award of counsel fees was excessive because it was not reduced by the traditional
present value approach.
143. See Selover v. Bryant, 54 Minn. 434, 46 N.W. 58 (1893).
144. See Hertzog v. Spartanburg Bonded Warehouses, 184 S.C. 378, 192 S.E. 397
(1937).
145. See 263 S.C. at 198, 209 S.E.2d at 48 (Brailsford, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 27
22




In common law jurisdictions, adoption has always been re-
garded as an artifical filiation or "the factitious creation of blood
relationship between persons who are not so related."'46 Because
of its artificiality, adoption has not enjoyed the natural and extra-
legal foundation of consanguinity filiation which remains the
basis of the law of.descent and distribution. 4 7 Common law
courts, narrowly construing adoption legislation in derogation of
the common law, have imposed their traditional conservatism
upon progressive adoption statutes and have refused to recognize
all forms of inheritance through adoptive filiation.' In the recent
decision of Cox v. Cox,"14 the South Carolina Supreme Court over-
came the traditional common law antagonism toward adoption
legislation and rejected absolute adherence to the concept of con-
sanguinity as the only theory of descent and distribution. In hold-
ing that adopted children could not inherit from their natural
parents, the court interpreted our adoption statutes50 in such a
manner as to encourage total assimilation of an adopted child
into the adopting family.
In Cox, a devisee' under the will of W. C. Cox brought an
action to partition a tract of land and to determine its proper
division according to the respective interests of the parties. Mr.
146. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modem, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956).
Some commentators have suggested that adoption is the oldest and most widely employed
of legal fictions. See II KOCOUREK & WIGmoRE, EVOLUTION OF THE LAW: PRIMITIVE AND
ANCIENT LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 344 (1915) and MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 130 (10th ed. 1901).
147. See, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. § 19-52 (1962).
148. See Dodson v. Ward, 31 N.M. 54, 240 P. 991 (1925), which emphasizes the
common law reliance on consanguinity:
Throughout the statutes of the several states consanguinity is fundamental in
legislative fixing of descent and distribution of property. True, the subject is one
of legislative will; but legislation repudiating or eliminating blood relationship
from the descent of property would be so abhorrent to every incident of our home
and family life as to meet with general disapproval. The courts should depart
from this elemental guideship only when forced to do so by an inexorable statu-
tory demand. Our statute is inexorable in its demand that the estate of one
dying shall go to his kindred; those of his blood, flesh of his flesh, bone of the
bone.
Id. at 60, 240 P. at 993.
149. 262 S.C. 8, 202 S.E.2d 6 (1974).
150. S.C. CODE: ANN. §§ 10-2587.1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1974).
151. Later in 1972 the named devisees under the testator's will had conveyed all of
their undivided right, title and interest in the tract of land concerned in the litigation to
Bill Cox, the natural son and a named devisee under the will, so that he and the defendant
(the adopted grandson) were the only parties in this action.
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Cox had died in 1964 leaving a will (which had been executed 7
years earlier) in which he devised a certain tract of land to his
wife for life with the remainder interest to his named children.
After the execution of his will, but prior to his death, one of Mr.
Cox's sons, a named devisee under the will, died intestate leaving
two minor children as his sole heirs at law. Mr. Cox, subsequent
to his son's death adopted his minor grandson; consequently, at
the time of his death, the testator was survived by his wife, his
natural children, and an adopted son' 2 who was not a named
devisee under the will.
The children of the testator's predeceased son would nor-
mally inherit the share of the testator's estate devised to their
father.'53 In partitioning the land, however, the lower court was
forced to construe the inheritance and adoption statutes in pari
materia to determine whether Mr. Cox's adoption of his grand-
son, after execution of his will, allowed the grandson to enjoy a
dual inheritance. Since an adopted child is considered a natural
child of the adopting parents born after execution of the will'54
and entitled to a share of the testator's estate,'5 the testator's
grandson could possibly claim a share of the estate of both his
natural father and his adoptive father. In affirming the lower
court's partition of the land, the supreme court rejected the con-
cept of dual inheritance and held that a final decree of adoption
severs all ties between the adopted child and the natural parents
and effectively bars any right of the child to inherit from them.5
152. Mr. Cox's minor granddaughter was adopted by one of his daughters and her
husband.
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-237 (1962) provides:
If any child should die in the lifetime of the father or mother, leaving issue, any
legacy of personalty or devise of real estate given in the last will of such father
or mother shall go to such issue, unless such deceased child was equally por-
tioned with the other children by the father or mother when living.
154. See Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C. 408, 172 S.E. 426 (1934).
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-235 (1962) provides:
If no provision shall be made by the will of the testator for any child or children
that may be born after his death such child or children shall be entitled to an
equal share of all real and personal estates given to any other child or children,
who shall contribute to make up such share or shares according to their respec-
tive interests or portions passing to them under such will.
This provision must be construed in connection with S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-236 (1962)
which states: "The provision made by § 19-235 for children born after the death of the
testator shall also apply to any child or children born to any person after the making and
executing of his last will and testament but previous to the decease of such person."
156. 262 S.C. at 13-14, 202 S.E.2d at 9.
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The precise question of dual inheritance by an adopted child
had never been raised before the supreme court and the absence
of specific statutory language made resolution of the issue uncer-
tain. The 1954 General Assembly enacted the following statute in
conjunction with descent and distribution to enlarge the scope of
inheritance by or from an adopted child:
Whenever a child has been legally adopted, such child shall
inherit from the adopting parents, and from each of them, and
the adopting parents and each or either of them shall inherit
from the adopted child, to the same extent as if he were a natu-
ral child of the adopting parents. For all inheritance purposes
without exception the adopted child shall be considered a natu-
ral child of the adopting parents and in the event of the death
of such adopted child, his estate shall ascend, descend and be
distributed as is otherwise provided by law for natural born
children of the same family, to the exclusion of the natural or
blood parents of such child .... "I
The statute plainly created a reciprocal right of inheritance in the
adopting parent, but the language of the statute raised doubt as
to the relationship between the adopted child and his natural
parents. ' Some commentators have suggested that the statute
was so ambitious that it became ambiguous; "if the adopted child
was to be treated without exception as a natural child for pur-
poses of inheritance, then much of what was specially provided
for was unnecessary."' 59
In a far-reaching enactment, the 1964 General Assembly re-
wrote South Carolina's adoption statutes and specifically re-
pealed the former provisions governing inheritance by and from
adopted children. 60 The newer statutes seemingly treated the
adopted child as removed from the bloodline of the natural par-
ent:
After the final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of
parent and child and all of the rights, duties and other legal
consequences of the natural relation of child and parent shall
thereafter exist between such adopted child and the person
adopting such child and the kindred of the adoptive parents.
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-52.1 (1962).
158. Note, Adoption in South Carolina, 9 S.C.L.Q. 210, 224 (1957).
159. Karesh, Wills, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 7 S.C.L.Q. 196, 204 (1954)
(emphasis added).
160. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2587.1-.18 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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From the date the final decree of adoption is entered, the
adopted child shall be considered a natural child of the adopting
parents for all inheritance purposes, both by and from such
child, to the exclusion of the natural or blood parents or kin of
such child. These rules of inheritance shall also apply to all the
parties where one of the natural parents is united in bonds of
matrimony to the other adopting parent.'6'
The breadth of the statute, however, is difficult to assess because
of the prior uncertainty of the law'62 and the proclivity of courts
in common law jurisdictions to interpret such statutes narrowly.
In Cox, the attorney for the adopted child attempted to jus-
tify the concept of dual inheritance by stressing the common law
concept of consanguinity. This concept had traditionally been
considered controlling in determining inheritance rights, unless
specific statutory language mandated that another factor be con-
sidered as governing. '63 In view of the importance of natural filia-
tion at common law, it was suggested that the adoption statute
merely barred the natural parent's right to inherit from the
adopted child.'64 In justification, the attorney contended that the
adoption process should be primarily concerned with the welfare
of the child who, at the time of adoption, was incapable of waiv-
ing his natural right of inheritance.16
In those jurisdictions which do not expressly regulate inheri-
tance between an adopted child and his natural parents, the pre-
vailing view is to recognize such a right of inheritance.'66 This
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.13 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
162. See Karesh, Wills, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 17 S.C.L.Q. 178, 188-
89 (1965).
163. Brief for Appellants at 7. The wife's counsel argued that:
Consanguinity is so fundamental in Statutes of Descent and Distribution that
it may only be ignored by construction when courts are forced so to do, either
by the express terms of the statute or by inexorable implication. An adopted
child is, in a legal sense, the child both of its natural and of its adopting parents,
and is not, because of the adoption, deprived of its right of inheritance from its
natural parents, unless the statute expressly so provides.
Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 7-8.
166. See Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951); Estate of Wilson,
95 Colo. 159, 33 P.2d 969 (1934); Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 P. 693 (1915); In re
Tilliski's Estate, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1945); Billings v. Head, 184 Ind. 361, 111 N.E.
177 (1916); Bartram v. Holcomb, 109 Kan. 87, 198 P. 192 (1921); Sorenson v. Churchill,
51 S.D. 113, 212 N.W. 488 (1927); In re Brenner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166 P.2d 257
(1946); In re Harrington's Estate, 96 Utah 252, 85 P.2d 630 (1938); In re Roderick's Estate,
158 Wash. 377, 291 P. 325 (1930).
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recognition largely rests upon a consent theory. Natural parents
are precluded from inheriting from the adopted child because
they consented to the transfer of their parental rights; however,
"no one consents for the innocent and helpless subject of the
transfer . . . [and he should not] lose the right to inherit from
his natural parent." ' 7
Using this consent rationale, many courts have recognized
dual inheritance with a variety of indefensible results. In Bartram
v. Holcomb,168 the Kansas Supreme Court was faced with a fac-
tual situation similar to Cox. That court allowed a grandchild
adopted by his grandfather to enjoy a dual inheritance, both in
his capacity as an adopted child and by representation through
his natural parent.
In Cox the opposing counsel argued that practical considera-
tions militated against dual inheritance. He stated that "[i]f an
adopted child were to inherit from his natural parent then, as a
matter of course, the validity of titles throughout the state where
adoptions have occurred where the decedent died intestate,
would be placed in jeopardy."'' 9 Although dual inheritance would
undoubtedly make the settlement of estates and determination of
title validity more burdensome, there exists possibly an even
more compelling rationale-improving the chances of total as-
similation of the adopted child into his adoptive family. As one
commentator put it:
The need for a psychological environment that assures success-
ful adoption dictates the complete removal of the child from his
natural family. Maintaining the child's connection with his nat-
ural family casts serious obstacles in the path of achieving mu-
tual affection and responsibility within the adoptive family...
[and] leaves the child uncertain as to whom he should treat as
"parents." Besides, prospective adoptive parents obviously de-
sire, and are entitled to, a protected privacy and free use of
discretion approximating that of a natural filial relationship.'70
167. Sorenson v. Churchill, 51 S.D. 113, 116, 212 N.W. 488, 489 (1927). In Goff v.
Benedict, 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269 (1969), the South Carolina Supreme Court recog-
nized that consent lies at the very foundation of South Carolina's adoption statutes. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.7 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
168. 109 Kan. 87, 198 P. 192 (1921).
169. Brief for Respondent at 7, Cox v. Cox, 262 S.C. 8, 202 S.E.2d 6 (1974).
170. Binavince, Adoption ahd the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative
Study and a Proposal for Model Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 152, 183-84 (1966). In Cox,
of course, the facts do not suggest such a compelling need to sever the relationship between
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Consequently, the court's decision, which in effect severed the
relationship between the adopted child and the natural parents,
works ultimately to the benefit of the child by enhancing the
prospects of successful adoption.
In interpreting that a final decree of adoption "ends an
adopted child's legal relationship with its natural parents. . . for
all inheritance purposes,"'' the supreme court tacitly recognized
that the concepts of dual inheritance and dual filiation are incon-
sistent with the basic goal of all adoption proceedings. Overcom-
ing the traditional common law hostility toward adoption, the
court has accorded adoptive filiation the same legal consequences
in the system of descent and distribution which heretofore had
been reserved to consanguinity filiation. The result of this pro-
gressive attitude undoubtedly benefits the adopted child and as-
sures full assimilation of the adoptive child into the adoptive
family.
the child and the natural parents, as the adoption was apparently one of convenience.
Most adoptions, however, are not made for convenience and a contrary decision in Cox
would have the effect of preventing assimilation of the adopted child into the adoptive
family in the vast majority of adoptions. Had Mr. Cox wished to adopt his grandson and
still provide him with the inheritance rights of his deceased son, he could have so altered
his will to name the grandson as a devisee.
171. Cox v. Cox, 262 S.C. at 13-14, 202 S.E.2d at 9 (1974).
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